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The historically high level of compensation enjoyed by U.S. executives, together with a series of
high-profile scandals, has fueled an intense public debate about executive pay and the need for
corporate governance reform. While economists have traditionally viewed executive compensation
contracts as an optimal response to the problem of providing incentives to firms’ managers, several
researchers (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001; Bebchuk and Fried, 2004) have recently put forth an
alternative view of executive compensation, according to which CEOs effectively set their own pay.
In line with this view, critics of current compensation practices—from activist institutional investors
to academics—have called for corporate governance reform aimed at increasing shareholders’ power
over managers and boards of directors.
In this paper, I propose a model of the firm in which the manager has discretion over his
own pay. The model addresses two of the main questions that underlie the debate about executive
compensation and corporate governance reform. First, how does shareholder power affect managers’
compensation and their incentives to maximize firm value? And, second, which is the optimal level
of shareholder power?
The model assumes that the board’s interests are aligned with those of the manager, with the
result that the manager effectively sets his own pay. The manager’s ability to extract rents is,
however, constrained by the threat of shareholder intervention: even if the board of directors serves
the manager’s interests, the shareholders of a publicly held corporation can still oust the manager
by launching a proxy contest to replace the board. Shareholders’ power is, however, limited, since
proxy contests face considerable hurdles. Apart from substantial procedural costs, there are free-
rider problems in all stages of the process, often aggravated by charter provisions (like staggered
boards) that add to the difficulty of replacing directors.1 In the model, I use the costs of staging a
successful proxy contest (which I label control costs) as a measure of shareholder power. Using this
measure, I find that greater shareholder power has the expected effect of reducing managerial pay.
However, greater shareholder power also weakens the manager’s incentives to maximize firm value.
1See, e.g., Bebchuk (2007) for a description of the costs associated with proxy contests.
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This result parallels the ones obtained by Burkart, Gromb, and Panunzi (1997), Pagano and Roell
(1998), Almazan and Suarez (2003) and Adams and Ferreira (2007), showing that too much control
by shareholders or the board may hurt managerial incentives. This paper, however, highlights a
novel mechanism by which shareholder power influences incentives; namely, through the effect that
shareholder power has on the relation between managerial pay and firm performance. Key to
understanding this mechanism is the fact that shareholders will only intervene when their expected
payoff from intervention net of control costs is higher than the return provided by the incumbent
manager. Therefore, shareholders will not intervene in states of nature in which expected cash flows
are low, since, in those states of nature, control costs exceed the payoff from intervention. This
implies that the manager effectively becomes the residual claimant when cash flows are lower than
the costs of control, while the relation between cash flows and pay is flatter when cash flows are
larger. Lowering the costs of control (that is, increasing shareholder power) reduces the set of states
in which the manager is the residual claimant and, therefore, weakens the manager’s incentives to
maximize firm value.
In a competitive capital market, an entrepreneur seeking outside equity financing for a project
will adopt the governance structure that, among those that ensure investors a sufficient return,
maximizes the project’s net present value. The negative effect of shareholder power on incentives
implies that, to achieve the goal of maximizing the project’s net present value, the entrepreneur
would like to minimize shareholder power. Investors, however, will contribute their funds only if
they are assured that they will obtain an adequate level of profits from the entrepreneur. There-
fore, to derive the optimal level of shareholder power, it is necessary to understand the effect of
shareholder power on profits. This effect is twofold. On the one hand, increasing shareholder power
(i.e., decreasing control costs) reduces the manager’s expected pay, and, thus, has a positive effect
on profits. On the other hand, by weakening the manager’s incentives, an increase in shareholder
power has the effect of reducing the expected value generated by the firm, and, thus, depresses
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profits. When shareholders wield substantial power, the latter effect may be stronger than the
former, so increasing shareholder power has the perverse effect of reducing profits. For lower levels
of shareholder power, however, increasing that power unambiguously increases profits. Therefore,
a trade off emerges between strengthening managerial incentives—which calls for reducing share-
holder power—and securing investors a sufficient return—which requires a high enough level of
shareholder power. I show that the level of shareholder power that achieves the optimal trade
off between incentives and shareholder return is the minimum among those that guarantee that
investors earn their required return. It is, thus, ex ante optimal for the entrepreneur to limit share-
holders’ power by choosing a governance structure that makes it costly for shareholders to replace
him. This result provides an explanation for the fact that firms’ governance arrangements do not
attempt to minimize control costs even at the IPO stage (Daines and Klausner, 2001; Field and
Karpoff, 2002).2 I also show that control costs will be greater when the entrepreneur’s actions have
a large impact on value, when the conflict of interest between shareholders and the manager is mod-
erate, and when the potential net present value of the project is large. Therefore, the model offers
potentially testable implications about the determinants of firms’ corporate governance structures.
The model also allows us to investigate the equilibrium relation between shareholder power and
firm performance. Demsetz (1983) has proposed that there should be no equilibrium relationship
between profit rates and the quality of corporate governance if corporate governance arrangements
are optimally set. If returns on assets are used as a measure of performance, I find that there
is indeed no equilibrium relationship between performance and control costs. If performance is
measured in terms of cash flows (gross of managerial compensation) or total surplus, however, the
equilibrium relationship between shareholder power and firm performance is negative. That is,
firms that optimally require greater shareholder power generate less value.
2Alternative explanations have been provided by DeAngelo and Rice (1983), Stulz (1988) and Stein (1988), al-
though Daines and Klausner (2001) claim that these explanations cannot explain the observed pattern of anti-takeover
provisions in IPO firms. DeAngelo and Rice (1983) and Stulz (1988) propose that anti-takeover provisions may confer
the manager a greater bargaining power when negotiating a takeover premium on behalf of the firm’s shareholders.
Stein (1988) argues that those provisions may prevent managerial myopia induced by the threat of takeover.
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The model presented here differs in two essential accounts from usual models of executive com-
pensation. First, while in usual models, compensation is determined by a contract designed by the
principal (be it shareholders or a board whose interests are aligned with those of shareholders), in
this paper, compensation is effectively determined by the manager. Therefore, the model fills a
gap in the literature on executive compensation, in which, despite much discussion about manage-
rial influence over pay, there is little theoretical work that explicitly incorporates that influence.3
Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) and Almazan and Suarez (2003) have recently developed models
in which the manager’s pay is determined through bargaining between the CEO and the board,
but the model in this paper is, to my knowledge, the first to formally derive the implications of
managerial discretion over pay.4 Second, usual executive compensation models generally regard
compensation arrangements as complete contingent contracts. This view limits their ability to con-
tribute to the current debate about corporate governance reform, since, as argued by Hart (1995), if
“principal-agent contracts are comprehensive, it is hard to find a role for governance structure” (p.
679).5 In contrast, I assume that pay is effectively determined ex post. This assumption reflects the
fact that actual compensation arrangements are, to a large extent, incomplete, with ample room
for ex post determination of pay by the board. Further, it allows us to link executive compensation
and governance structure, understood, along the lines of the incomplete contracting approach pro-
posed by Hart (1995) or Zingales (1998), as the set of constraints that shape the ex post bargaining
over the quasi-rents generated by the firm. In modeling pay as effectively determined ex post by
3In his oft-cited review of the executive compensation literature, Murphy (1999) states: “[T]here is no doubt,
however, that CEOs and other top managers exert at least some influence on both the level and structure of their
pay.” The debate among researchers has focused on whether this influence is strong enough to merit a departure
from the optimal contracting framework. Thus, Murphy and Zabojnik (2004), Hermalin (2005), or Gabaix and
Landier (2006) offer explanations to current trends that do not involve managerial rent extraction. Jensen, Murphy,
and Wruck (2004) also provide an explanation based on directors’ failure to understand the costs of stock option
compensation. In this paper, I contribute to this debate, which should be elucidated empirically, by providing testable
implications of managerial discretion over pay.
4Recently, Singh (2006) has also developed a model in which reputational concerns by board directors may lead
them to design inefficient pay packages for managers.
5See, however, Hermalin and Weisbach (2006) for a discussion of governance reform when corporate governance is
understood as a set of contracts. Hermalin and Weisbach (2006) consider that, in that context, reforms may translate
into greater precision of the signal of managerial performance received by the board, or into greater costs for the
manager of concealing information.
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the manager, I draw from the work of Fluck (1998, 1999) and Myers (2000), who have shown, in
a repeated game context, that outside equity financing is sustainable even if performance is not
contractible and managers can costlessly divert cash flows.
The paper is organized as follows. The model is introduced in Section 1. The relation between
control costs and incentives is analyzed in Section 2, while Section 3 studies the impact of changes
in control costs on performance. Section 4 analyzes the firm’s financing stage and Section 5 derives
the optimal level of control costs. Finally, Section 6 discusses several implications of the model,
and Section 7 concludes.
1 Setup
Consider a risk-neutral entrepreneur who can undertake an investment project that requires an
initial investment of I dollars. To finance this initial investment, the entrepreneur issues equity
that is sold to outside investors. By buying the firm’s equity shares, investors acquire the right
to receive the residual earnings generated by the firm and the right to decide on any of the firm’s
matters, including the entrepreneur’s permanence as manager and his pay. The operation of the
firm is, however, delegated to the manager. If the project is financed, the manager makes a strategic
decision that determines the profitability of the project. I assume that the firm is liquidated once
the project is completed. The stages of the model are described next and summarized in Figure 1:
1. The entrepreneur issues shares, which are offered to a pool of risk-neutral outside investors. If
the total amount that investors are willing to pay for the shares, PE , is greater than the cost
of the project, I, the project is financed. For simplicity, it is assumed that the entrepreneur
does not retain any ownership share.
2. If the project is financed, the manager chooses an action a ∈ A, where A = [0, a]. Action a is a
strategic decision that determines the profitability of the project. Actions are ordered so that
higher values of a correspond to actions that lead to higher expected revenues. Therefore,
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a can be interpreted as a one-dimensional measure of the degree of alignment between the
actions taken by the manager and those that would lead to the maximization of the project’s
revenues. I assume that there is a conflict of interest between the manager and shareholders,





This cost reflects the opportunity cost of dedicating time and effort to the pursuit of profit
maximization rather than to other activities that would, other things equal, be preferred by
the manager. For example, if we interpret a as the time and effort devoted by the manager
to investigating the consequences of the different strategic options available, then η(a) would
simply reflect the usual cost of effort. Alternatively, we can interpret a as an actual strategic
choice, such as the selection of the type of product offered by the firm. The manager may
know some markets better or may enjoy working with certain products. Choosing the profit-
maximizing product would, thus, have the personal cost for the manager of learning how to
operate in a relatively unknown market or of giving up the personal benefits of working with
a product that is appealing to the manager. Although a is to be interpreted generally as
a measure of the degree of alignment between the actions taken by the manager and those
that would be preferred by shareholders, I will often refer to a simply as ‘effort’ for the sake
of brevity. The parameter α in (1) is a measure of the severity of the potential conflict of
interest between the manager and shareholders.
3. The action taken by the manager determines the probability distribution of firm revenues x.
In line with the definition of a, it is assumed that revenues (net of all costs except for the
manager’s compensation) are given by:
x = pa+ ², (2)
where p is a parameter that reflects the importance of the manager’s actions. The random
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variable ² is assumed to be distributed normally with mean zero and density φ. It is worth
noting that the results do not hinge on the particular specification of the stochastic relation
between a and x. I employ the functional form specified in (2) because of its intuitive appeal
and tractability, but the results can be derived for more general specifications.6
4. After x is observed, the manager offers to pay d to shareholders.
5. If shareholders are satisfied with the return offered to them by the manager, they do not
intervene. Otherwise, they exercise their control rights, fire the manager and hire a replace-
ment to run the firm under direct owner oversight until the end of the period. Replacing the
manager involves costs of control c for shareholders. The replacement is paid a competitively
determined salary µ, which I assume, for simplicity, to be zero.
6. Finally, payoffs are distributed among shareholders and the manager. If there is no inter-
vention, the manager’s compensation consists of the earnings that remain after paying d to
shareholders. If there is intervention, the manager is fired and earns µ = 0 elsewhere.
-
1. Equity issue




7. Payoffs distributed3. a
2. I invested in project
Figure 1: Time line
Throughout the paper, I denote by θ ≡ (p, α, I) the vector of parameters of the model. I solve
the model by backward induction. Thus, I first analyze in Sections 2 and 3 the equilibrium in
the subgame that starts after the firm receives financing. Then, I study in Sections 4 and 5 the
financing stage. Before proceeding with the equilibrium analysis, however, I discuss some of the
model’s assumptions in greater detail.
6In particular, we could consider a general distribution of revenues with associated density f(x|a). Assuming that
this density satisfies the so-called monotone likelihood ratio property—common in principal-agent models—would be
sufficient to derive the main results.
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1.1 Compensation, contracts and managerial discretion over pay
As discussed in the introduction, the model incorporates two main assumptions that distinguish it
from usual models of executive compensation. The first assumption is that it is not possible to write
enforceable contingent compensation contracts. Therefore, the manager’s pay is not determined
ex ante by a contract that makes pay contingent on firm performance, but, instead, is determined
ex post, after the manager—and shareholders—observe the firm’s revenues. This assumption is
motivated by actual practice. First, with the exception of some provisions to be found mainly
in executives’ employment contracts, compensation arrangements do not take the form of explicit
contracts that can be enforced by a court.7 Further, compensation plans only loosely characterize
the way in which executives are to be rewarded and leave ample room for ex post discretion in
the determination of the manager’s pay.8 The board usually has discretion to set the base salary,
and bonus payments and stock option or equity grants are often made contingent on the board’s
subjective appraisal of the manager’s performance. Further, even though objective performance
measures are widely used, the board can usually decide which measures to use and how to do so.
Boards also have discretion over the timing of stock option grants, which they could strategically
use to the advantage of the CEO by, say, granting options before announcing good news about the
firm or coinciding with an abnormally low price of the firm’s stock (Yermack, 1997). In fact, during
the 1990s and 2000s, many firms “backdated” options (Heron and Lie, 2007), that is, they picked
as grant date a past date on which the stock price was particularly low.9 Boards are also able to
7Employment contracts often contain provisions regarding entry salaries, joining bonuses and, most often, sev-
erance payments. It is worth noting, however, that a large fraction of CEOs do not even have formal employment
contracts, but are rather at-will employees of their firms (Schwab and Thomas, 2006).
8The following quotes illustrate this point: “Assurant [...] says its compensation committee can adjust incen-
tive payments for extraordinary events, “including, but not limited to, acquisitions or dispositions of businesses,
litigation costs, tax or insurance recoveries or settlements, changes to accounting principles, asset impairment and
restructuring.”” (Morgenson, 2006). “The target for [Home Depot’s CEO] had been total shareholder return [...]
compared with a peer group, and the company was performing poorly by that measure in 2003, according to the
Corporate Library. But that year, the board changed the target to one of growth in average diluted earnings per
share.” (Creswell, 2006).
9Stock options are almost universally granted with an exercise price equal to the price of the stock on the date
of the grant. Thus, choosing a date in which the stock price is low increases the manager’s expected gains. With
backdating, this is achieved with no risk.
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adjust their policies to undo the effects of past compensation decisions. For example, after a fall
in the stock price, boards can reprice options (although few choose to do so anymore) or replace
extant options with new ones with a lower exercise price.
Although the issue will not be investigated here, it is worth noting that, given the complexity
of the executive role and the need to retain valuable executives, the incompleteness of executive
compensation contracts may well be optimal (Bernheim and Whinston, 1998; Baker, Gibbons, and
Murphy, 1994). Further, board directors could use the discretion that this incompleteness grants
them to pursue shareholders’ interests. As mentioned in the introduction, however, there are good
reasons to think that managers’ interests play an important role in the process by which managerial
compensation is set (see, e.g., Bebchuk and Fried, 2004, ch. 23, for a description of the pay setting
process). To study the consequences of managers’ influence over the determination of their own
pay, I make the extreme assumption that the board actually serves the manager’s interests when
setting his pay. To capture both ex post pay determination and managerial discretion over pay, I
assume that, after the state of nature is realized, the manager decides how much of the revenues to
keep and how much to distribute to shareholders. Therefore, the manager’s compensation is given
by
m(x) = x− d (3)
It is important to note that the assumption of managerial discretion over pay does not mean
that the manager has the ability to freely set any compensation contract for himself. Apart from
problems of costly contracting that may prevent the writing and enforcement of meaningful com-
pensation contracts, I assume that the very power that allows the manager to determine his pay
prevents him from committing to any contract that does not give him the maximum compensation




Shareholders legally possess the right to control the firm. If the manager, to whom they delegate
the exercise of that control, sets an excessive level of compensation, shareholders will reassert their
control rights and intervene to secure a sufficient return. Therefore, the manager’s ability to set
his own compensation is limited by the threat of owner intervention.
The model assumes that if shareholders intervene, they fire the manager and hire a replacement
to run the firm under direct owner oversight until the end of the period. In such a case, both
the departing manager and his replacement are assumed to earn µ, which can be interpreted as a
market-determined entry salary for managers without firm-specific skills. It is also assumed that
the key strategic decisions are made by the initial manager and are summarized by a. The actions
taken by the manager after selecting a are assumed to be day-to-day operating decisions, which
have a lesser influence on profits. Therefore, I do not explicitly model those decisions and assume
that the revenues generated by the firm are x = pa+², independently of whether the manager is the
initial one or a replacement.10 Under this assumption, shareholders’ payoff in case of intervention
is given by x− µ = x, since I assume, for simplicity, that µ = 0.
Although I consider that shareholder intervention takes the form of CEO replacement, other
forms of shareholder intervention are possible. Shareholders could try to negotiate a pay reduction
with the manager, vote down management-sponsored compensation proposals,11 or challenge the
manager’s compensation in court.12 The assumption that shareholder intervention takes the form
of manager replacement is made mainly for simplicity, and results would not change if we assumed,
10Revenues could fall after firing the manager if he had acquired firm- or project-specific skills. This can be
accounted for in the model if c is interpreted as reflecting not only the direct costs of intervention but also the loss of
the manager’s specific skills. Since the model is a pure moral hazard model, however, I do not consider the possibility
that alternative managers may be of different ability.
11Morgan, Poulsen, and Wolf (2006), however, document that—even though the number of negative votes increases
over time—of 2,083 management-sponsored compensation proposals corresponding to the period 1992-2003, only eight
were voted down by shareholders. Shareholders can also attempt to vote proposals aimed at reducing the manager’s
compensation. However, these proposals are not binding, so boards can, and routinely do, disregard them.
12Bebchuk and Fried (2004), ch. 3, review the obstacles to the success of a lawsuit challenging managers’ com-
pensation packages. Citing evidence provided by Barris (1992) that in almost all cases since 1900 involving publicly
traded firms, courts have refused to overturn board compensation decisions, Bebchuk and Fried (2004) affirm that
“as a practical matter, judicial review fails to impose any constraint on executive pay” (p. 45).
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instead, that intervention did not involve replacing the manager, but only reducing his pay down
to his reservation salary µ.13
1.3 Control costs
Shareholder intervention is not costless. If the board of directors acts in the interest of the manager
and not of shareholders, as assumed in the model, the only avenue left to shareholders to replace
the manager is to stage a proxy fight to vote a new board of directors. Proxy fights are, however,
very expensive and subject to severe free-riding problems. On the one hand, the costs of staging a
proxy fight, which are typically very high, are borne by the shareholders who organize it, while the
benefits are shared with all shareholders.14 On the other hand, there is also a free-riding problem
when voting, since the costs of acquiring and processing information about the competing slates
are privately borne, while the benefits are shared with all owners.
Therefore, owners will only intervene if the return that the manager grants them lies below
the one they would obtain if they intervened, net of the costs of replacing the manager. I label
these costs control costs and denote them by c. Thus, if revenues are x, shareholders’ return from
intervention is x−c. In the model, control costs, thus, act as a convenient summary of the different
elements that determine shareholder power, such as the firm’s ownership structure, the degree of
legal protection of shareholders, or the inclusion of amendments in the firm’s charter that impede
the replacement of the manager or the board.
1.4 Sequence of events
There are two features of the sequence of events described in Figure 1 that deserve comment. First,
as described above, the assumption that the manager’s compensation is determined after the firm’s
outcome is realized is not arbitrary, but meant to reflect both the manager’s ability to determine
his own compensation and his inability, due to the very same reasons, to commit ex ante to any
13In modelling shareholder intervention as managerial replacement, I also follow Fluck (1998, 1999) and Myers
(2000).
14See Bebchuk (2007) for a detailed account of these costs.
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compensation contract that does not ex post give him the maximum possible pay.
The second feature that deserves comment is the assumption that shareholders’ intervention
decision takes place after the manager announces the return that will be paid to shareholders.
In a one-period model, this return is meant to capture the part of the cash flow generated by
the firm that accrues to shareholders and, thus, can be equally understood as profits or the value
of the firm’s equity. The assumption that shareholders react to profit announcements and not
to actual dividend payments is necessary in a one-period model. In such a model, there is no
room for disciplining the manager after payoffs have been distributed (unless shareholders could
somehow force the manager to return part of his pay), so the manager would extract all rents.
With the assumption that shareholders react to the manager’s profit announcement, the model
is to be interpreted as a reduced-form version of a repeated-interaction model, such as the ones
developed by Fluck (1998) and Myers (2000), in which the manager pays dividends each period
and shareholders base their intervention decision on past dividend payments.15
2 Control costs and incentives
In this section, I analyze how control costs determine the manager’s action choice and expected pay.
To do so, I proceed by backward induction: first, I analyze shareholders’ decision as to whether to
accept the manager’s offer or to intervene; then, I analyze the manager’s optimal offer; and, finally,
I study the manager’s action choice.
2.1 Optimal return announcement and managerial compensation
Shareholders will accept any return offer at least as high as the profits, net of the costs of interven-
tion, that they can obtain if they intervene, x− c. If shareholders accept an offer d, the manager’s
compensation is m = x − d. It follows that, for any x, the manager will make the lowest offer
15In a more literal interpretation of the model, the return obtained by shareholders can be understood as a
liquidation dividend.
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acceptable to shareholders. Therefore, the manager’s optimal announcement strategy is:
d(x) =
{
0 if x < c
x− c if x ≥ c (4)
Since owners will always accept d(x), the manager’s compensation is:
m(x) =

0 if x < 0
x if 0 < x < c
c if x > c
(5)
Therefore, the performance-pay profile implied by the model’s pay setting process is concave,
as illustrated in Figure 2: while for low levels of revenues (x < c), the manager is the sole residual
claimant, for higher levels of revenues (x < c), the manager’s compensation is flat. It is worth
noting that this pattern is opposite to the one that would characterize an optimal contract between
a risk neutral principal and a risk-neutral agent in the presence of two-sided limited liability (Innes,
1990). It also differs starkly from the convex performance-pay relation implied by stock options.
It is worth remarking, however, that, in a dynamic setting, stock options are compatible with the









Figure 2: Compensation as a function of revenues.
It is important to note that the manager’s optimal return policy guarantees that there is no
shareholder intervention in equilibrium. The threat of owner intervention, nonetheless, determines
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both shareholder returns and managerial compensation in equilibrium.
2.2 The manager’s action choice
If the manager chooses action a, his compensation, as a function of the stochastic component of
revenues, ², is:
m(²|a, c, θ) =

0 if ² < −pa
pa+ ² if −pa < ² < −pa+ c
c if ² > −pa+ c
(6)
Therefore, for a given level of a, there are three distinct regions in the support of ². In the
first region (² < −pa), revenues are negative, so the manager’s compensation is zero.16 In the
second region (−pa < ² < −pa + c), revenues are lower than control costs, so the manager keeps
all revenues generated by the firm. Finally, in the third region (² > −pa+ c), the manager has to
pay x − c to shareholders, so his compensation is c < x. It follows that the manager’s expected
compensation for a given effort level a is:







Applying Leibniz’s rule, we can see how the net change in expected compensation caused by an
increase in a is:
∂Em
∂a
=− pcφ(−pa+ c) + p(pa− pa)φ(−pa) +
∫ −pa+c
−pa




pφ(²)d² > 0 (9)
Therefore, the marginal return of effort for the manager is the expected marginal increase in
pay in the region in which the manager is the sole residual claimant.
If we let EU(a, c, θ) denote the manager’s expected utility as a function of a (given c and the
parameter vector θ), then:




16Limited liability ensures that, in this case, both the manager and shareholders obtain a payoff of zero.
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φ(²)d²− αa∗ = 0 (FOC)
2.3 Control costs, optimal effort and pay
How does the level of control costs affect the structure and level of pay and the manager’s choices?
Inspection of Figure 2 reveals that the effect of an increase in c is twofold. On the one hand, it
raises the maximum level of revenues for which the manager is the sole residual claimant. On the
other hand, it increases the compensation that the manager obtains for any realization of profits
that leads to a positive return for shareholders. It follows that for any a, expected pay goes up
when c increases. Further, the fact that an increase in c widens the region in which the manager is
the residual claimant suggests that increasing c may give the manager greater incentives to select
a high level of a. Inspection of the first-order condition (FOC) indeed shows that an increase in c
increases the manager’s marginal return of effort. Therefore, a∗ will increase with c, as stated in
the following proposition (all proofs are in the appendix):
Proposition 1 Let a∗(c, θ) be the manager’s action choice given c and θ. Then: 1) a∗(c, θ) is
increasing in c; 2) EU(a∗(c, θ), c, θ) is increasing in c; and 3) Em(a∗(c, θ), c, θ) is increasing in c.
Part 1) runs counter usual expectations regarding the relationship between shareholders’ ability
to discipline the manager and performance. While it is usually assumed that higher costs of control
will negatively affect performance, Proposition 1 shows that if the manager has the power to
set his own compensation, greater costs of control increase his incentives to maximize profits. The
intuition behind parts 2) and 3) is straightforward: an increase in c increases the manager’s expected
compensation for any level of a; since expected pay is also increasing in a, it follows from part 1)
17Even though EU may not be globally concave, it can be shown (see Appendix B) that the first-order condition
uniquely identifies the manager’s optimum.
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that expected pay must go up when c increases (part 3). Further, since a higher c raises expected
utility for any level of a, the manager must be able to do better when c increases (part 2).
The following proposition provides further predictions regarding the relationship between the
manager’s expected compensation and parameters that reflect the manager’s productivity (p) and
the severity of the conflict of interest between the manager and shareholders (α):
Proposition 2 Let Em∗(c, θ) ≡ Em(a∗(c, θ), c, θ). Then, Em∗ is increasing in p and decreasing
in α.
Expected compensation increases with p, since a larger p increases pay for any a, and induces the
manager to exert more effort. When the opportunity cost of effort is greater (α increases), on the
other hand, it is optimal for the manager to lower effort provision, reducing expected pay.
3 Control costs, efficiency and profits
One of the key questions in the study of corporate governance is whether and how corporate
governance influences firm performance. In this section, I analyze the effect of changes in control
costs on different performance measures.
3.1 Control costs and efficiency
Proposition 1 shows that an increase in control costs increases effort and, thus, suggests that
greater control costs may reduce the efficiency loss stemming from the agency relationship between
shareholders and the manager. The following proposition shows that, for any level of control
costs, there is underprovision of effort. Therefore, higher control costs—by leading to greater
effort provision—indeed have the effect of increasing both expected revenues and expected total
firm value (the sum of the manager’s expected utility and expected profits). Let EV (a, θ) =∫∞
−pa(pa + ²)φ(²)d² − αa
2
2 denote total expected firm value and ae(θ) denote the value-maximizing
level of a: ae(θ) = argmaxa EV (a, θ). Further, let Ex∗(c, θ) ≡ E(x|a∗(c, θ), θ) be the expected
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revenue generated by the project, and EV ∗(c, θ) ≡ EV (a∗(c, θ), θ) the total expected firm value if
the manager selects a∗(c, θ). With this notation, I can state the following proposition:
Proposition 3 For any c, θ: 1) a∗(c, θ) ≤ ae(θ); and 2) Ex∗(c, θ), EV ∗(c, θ) are increasing in c.
Proposition 3 shows that for any level of control costs, it is optimal to further increase c. To
interpret this result, however, it is essential to bear in mind its second-best nature. Proposition
3 states that, if the board is captured by the manager, so the latter cannot be given an optimal
ex ante compensation contract, then it is value-increasing to raise control costs. If low enough
levels of control costs guaranteed that the board would serve shareholders’ interests, however, then
it would be globally optimal to reduce control costs to zero. Therefore, the practical implication
of Proposition 3 is that, if there were a lower bound for c, then it may be optimal to increase
control costs beyond that lower bound. Suppose, for example, that the need for diversification by
investors implies that the ownership structure of large firms will necessarily be dispersed. Further,
suppose that regulation alone cannot prevent the manager from capturing the director nomination
process, so that, in the absence of active intervention by shareholders, the board will act in the
interest of the manager. In such a context, there will be a lower bound for c and Proposition 3
implies that it may not be optimal to bring control costs down to that lower bound. Therefore,
Proposition 3 suggests caution when evaluating corporate governance reform proposals aimed at
increasing shareholder power.
3.2 Control costs and profits
Although higher control costs, by increasing effort provision, translate into higher expected rev-
enues, they also have the direct effect of reducing shareholders’ payoff for any realization of revenues.
Therefore, the net effect of an increase in control costs on profits cannot be signed a priori. To




(pa∗ + ²− c)φ(²)d² (11)
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Applying Leibniz’s rule we obtain:
∂Ed∗
∂c






∂c . It follows that the sign of the effect of an increase in control costs on profits depends
on whether an increase in control costs leads to an even greater increase in expected revenues. The












, then there exists a c˜(θ) > 0, such that Ed∗(c, θ) is increasing in c for
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high enough, an increase in control costs reduces profits when control costs are high, but it raises





is a measure of the sensitivity of the manager’s
action choice a∗ to changes in control costs, on the one hand, and of the sensitivity of expected
profits to changes in a∗, on the other. Thus, if p is large, an increase in c has a large impact
on expected compensation and, thus, increases the sensitivity of the manager’s effort to changes
in c. Further, an increase in p amplifies the impact on expected profits of an increase in a∗. If
the conflict-of-interest parameter α is high, control costs increases will have a smaller effect on a∗,
since a higher α implies a higher marginal cost of effort. The right-hand side of the inequalities
in Proposition 4 is the value of the normal p.d.f. at zero and is a measure of the precision with
which the manager’s actions translate into revenues: the higher φ(0), the more the distribution of











only plausible, but, as I show in Section 4, is actually necessary for financing to be possible under
reasonable restrictions on the parameters.
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4 Control costs and firm financing
Higher control costs increase the total value generated by the firm, yet, eventually they also reduce
shareholders’ expected return. Therefore, for high enough levels of control costs, there will be a
trade-off between increasing total firm value and securing investors a return that is sufficient to
induce them to invest in the project. In this section, I analyze this trade-off and determine the
levels of control costs that allow the entrepreneur to finance the project.
If investors correctly anticipate the manager’s choice of action, the maximum they will be willing
to pay for the firm’s equity will be the expected return that they would obtain if the project is
carried out: Ed∗(c, θ). I will assume, as customary (see, e.g., Tirole, 2001), that the capital market
is competitive and the interest rate is zero, so investors will pay exactly PE = Ed∗(c, θ) for the
equity offered to them by the entrepreneur. Financing will be possible if and only if PE ≥ I, that
is, if and only if the following financing constraint holds:
Ed∗(c, θ) ≥ I (FC)
For the problem to be interesting, I make two assumptions about I. The first one is that the
net present value of the project is negative if the manager exerts no effort:
Assumption AS.1
∫∞
0 ²φ(²)d² < I.
Note that this assumption implies that if pa ≤ c, then Ed∗ < I, so, that, for financing to be
possible, it must be the case that pa∗(c, θ) > c, i.e., expected revenues must exceed the costs of
control.
The second assumption is that it would be worth it for the manager to undertake the project
if he had the I dollars necessary to carry it out. If the manager were the sole owner of the firm,
he would choose action ae(θ), which is defined above as the action that maximizes total expected
firm value. Thus, I require:
Assumption AS.2 EV (ae(θ), θ)− I > 0.
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If AS.2 did not hold, financing would not be possible for any level of c. Under Assumptions AS.1
and AS.2, it is straightforward to show that:
Proposition 5 If financing is possible for some c, then it is possible if and only if c ∈ [c(θ), c(θ)],
where c(θ) > 0.
This proposition follows immediately from Propositions 1 and 4 and from Assumption AS.1.
First, AS.1 implies that financing is not possible when c = 0, since if c = 0, then a∗(0, θ) = 0.18
Therefore, financing will be possible only if c > 0 and if shareholder returns are increasing in
c at least for low values of c (i.e., according to Proposition 4, only if p2/α > 1/φ(0)). The
latter requirement is necessary, since, Assumption AS.1 implies that expected profits at c = 0
are lower than I, so that, if they were decreasing in c, they would be lower than I for any c.
Second, Proposition 4 shows that, even if expected profits increase in c for low values of c, they
are decreasing in c for c large enough. In fact, if Ed∗(c, θ) > I for some c, then there is a c(θ) ≥ 0,
such that Ed∗(c(θ), θ) = I and Ed∗(c(θ), θ) < I for c > c(θ).19 Therefore, if financing is possible,
then it is possible only for an interval of control costs bounded away from zero.
Proposition 5 has the implication that if managerial incentives are provided only by the threat
of shareholder intervention, a positive level of control costs is not only compatible, but necessary
for the firm to obtain financing. I discuss this implication in greater detail in Section 6.
5 Optimal control costs
Control costs may be partly determined by factors beyond the entrepreneur’s control, like the
quality of the legal system or the listing requirements of the exchange where the firm’s shares are
issued. However, at the IPO stage, the entrepreneur has some leeway to determine the magnitude
of control costs. This can be done by including provisions in the firm’s charter that make it
18If c = 0, then EU(a, 0, θ) =
∫ −pa
−pa (pa + ²)φ(²)d² +
∫∞





, so the optimal level of effort is
a∗(0, θ) = 0.
19This follows from continuity of Ed∗ and the fact that, for c high enough, Ed∗ < I. To see this, let c0 ≥ pae(θ).
Since a∗(c, θ) ≤ ae(θ) for any c, it follows that pa∗(c0, θ) ≤ pae(θ) ≤ c0. Therefore, Assumption AS.1 implies that
Ed∗(c0, θ) < I.
20
difficult to oust a board, by selecting a manager-friendly board, or by means of the initial choice
of ownership structure (with, for example, a more dispersed ownership structure leading to higher
costs of control because of small individual stakes and severe free-rider problems). To the extent
that the entrepreneur has the ability to determine the costs of control, we should expect that these
costs will be set so as to maximize the entrepreneur’s ex ante expected utility. Letting EU∗(c, θ)
denote this ex ante expected utility, we obtain that if the entrepreneur obtains financing:







(pa∗ + ²)φ(²)d²− αa
∗2
2
− I = EV (a∗(c, θ), θ)− I (13)
where the second equality comes from the competitive capital market assumption PE = Ed∗. The
entrepreneur’s ex ante expected utility is, thus, equal to the expected utility (net of investment
costs) that he would obtain if he were the sole owner of the firm and took action a∗. Therefore,
the entrepreneur will set the level of c so as to maximize the value of the venture. Since i) this
value (EV (a, θ)) is increasing in a for any a below the efficient level ae(θ); ii) the manager’s choice,
a∗(c, θ), is below the efficient level ae(θ) for any c; and iii) a∗(c, θ) is increasing in c, it follows that
the optimal level of control costs is the maximum compatible with financing:
Proposition 6 The unique optimal level of control costs c∗(θ) is defined by:
1. Ed∗(c∗(θ), θ) = I, and
2. c∗(θ) > c˜(θ),
for c˜ defined in Proposition 4. Since Ed∗(c, θ) is increasing in c for low values of c when financing is
possible, the second condition in the proposition ensures that the optimum is in the region of control
costs where expected shareholder returns are decreasing in c (since, otherwise, further increasing c
would increase value without precluding financing).
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6 Discussion of the results
In this section, I derive comparative statics results regarding the determinants of control costs and
their relation with firm performance, and present some additional implications of the model.
6.1 Determinants of control costs
Proposition 6 characterizes the optimal level of control costs. To the extent that control costs are
set optimally by entrepreneurs, we can derive how these control costs will vary when parameter
values change:
Proposition 7 The optimal level of control costs is decreasing in α and I and increasing in p.
To understand this result, one should recall that for any level of control costs, there is underpro-
vision of managerial effort (a∗(c, θ) ≤ ae(θ)). Therefore, since the entrepreneur captures ex ante the
whole net present value of the project, he will always try to set c as high as allowed by the financing
constraint. Thus, any change that relaxes the financing constraint will increase the optimal cost
of control, while any change that makes the financing constraint stricter will reduce the optimal
cost of control. The effect of I on control costs is, thus, immediate: a higher I does not have any
direct effect on effort provision and makes the financing constraint stricter. Therefore, increases
in I reduce c∗. It is important to notice that, other things equal, an increase in I amounts to a
reduction of the net present value of the project. Therefore, Proposition 7 implies that projects
with a lower net present value should be associated with a lower c∗. Increases in α do not have any
direct effect on the financing constraint, but reduce effort provision for any level of c and, thus,
make the financing constraint more demanding. Finally, changes in p have both direct and indirect
effects on the financing constraint, since they have an effect on expected profits for fixed c and a
and also on effort provision for given c. The net effect of an increase in p is always to relax the
financing constraint, so a higher p implies a higher optimal level of control costs. Proposition 7,
in sum, predicts that control costs will be higher (i.e., shareholder power will be lower) in firms
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where the conflict of interest between shareholders and the manager is less severe, for projects with
higher returns on assets, or where the impact of the manager’s actions on revenues is larger.
6.2 Optimal control costs and performance
In Section 3, I studied the impact of changes in control costs on performance, other things equal. To
the extent that control costs can be considered mainly exogenous for the individual entrepreneur,
Propositions 3 and 4 can be interpreted as providing predictions regarding the relation between
control costs and different measures of performance. If, however, control costs can be considered
as being to a large extent determined by the entrepreneur, then, to obtain empirical predictions
about the relation between control costs and performance, one has to analyze the equilibrium
determination of control costs and performance and investigate how equilibrium values respond to
changes in parameters. Here, I carry out this analysis and evaluate the hypothesis advanced by
Demsetz (1983) that there should be no relationship between the quality of corporate governance
and performance if corporate governance arrangements are optimally set, since, in such a case,
corporate governance would have been chosen to maximize value. It is important to note that, even
if we assume that control costs are set optimally, there can still exist an equilibrium relationship
between control costs and performance if performance measures and control costs co-vary in a
consistent way when parameter values change. For example, a higher marginal return of managerial
effort could lead to both a higher optimal cost and higher equilibrium revenues. The following
proposition shows that if performance is measured in terms of revenues or in terms of total value,
there will exist a positive equilibrium correlation between control costs and performance:
Proposition 8 Let Ex∗∗(θ) = Ex∗(c∗(θ), θ) and EV ∗∗(θ) = EV ∗(c∗(θ), θ). Then, Ex∗∗(θ),
EV ∗∗(θ) and c∗(θ) vary in the same direction in response to changes in any parameter value.
The intuition behind this result is as follows. A change in any parameter value affects ex ante
expected revenues, Ex∗∗(θ) = pa∗(c∗(θ), θ), in three ways. First, it may directly affect expected
revenues for fixed a and c. Second, it influences the manager’s choice of effort even if c∗ does
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not change. And, third, it affects the choice of effort indirectly through its effect on c∗. For all
parameters, all three effects operate in the same direction, so a change in any parameter has an
unambiguous effect on Ex∗∗. This implies, in particular, that the sign of the effect of the change in
the parameter value on c∗ and Ex∗∗ is the same. For example, an increase in p, increases the return
of the manager’s effort, leads the manager to exert more effort for any value of c, and increases c∗,
which also leads to greater effort. An analogous argument holds for EV ∗∗.
If we consider as our measure of performance the return obtained by shareholders on their
investment, however, Demsetz’s (1983) prediction that there should be no relation between control
costs and performance is borne out trivially because of the assumption that capital markets are
competitive. Given this assumption, PE = Ed∗ for any project that obtains financing; therefore,
shareholders always obtain the rate of return of the alternative asset (which I assumed to be zero).
It is more interesting to consider as our measure of performance shareholders’ return on the firm’s
assets (which, in our context, is analogous to Tobin’s q). Thus, let Q∗(c, θ) denote the return on
the firm’s assets when a = a∗(c, θ), and Q∗∗(θ) = Ed∗(c∗(θ), θ)/I denote the return on the firm’s
assets when a = a∗(c, θ) and c is set optimally. Since Ed∗ = I if c is set optimally, then:
Proposition 9 Q∗∗(θ) = 1 for any θ for which financing is possible.
It is worth remarking that, if c were not set optimally, then Q∗ could be higher than one and it
would not be possible to sign a priori the relation between Q∗ and control costs. It is also important
to note when interpreting Propositions 7, 8 and 9 that they rely both on the assumptions about the
executive pay-setting process and on the assumption that investors correctly anticipate the effect
of control costs and parameter values on the manager’s behavior.
6.3 Optimal anti-takeover protection at the IPO stage
Proposition 5 states that financing requires a positive level of control costs and that it may be
compatible with relatively large control costs. This prediction may help explain the finding that
firms going public consistently include provisions in their charters, such as anti-takeover provisions
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(ATPs), that make replacing the management team more difficult for shareholders (Daines and
Klausner, 2001; Field and Karpoff, 2002). These provisions have been regarded as puzzling (Daines
and Klausner, 2001) under the assumption that they create agency costs that reduce firm value: if
their negative effect on firm value were correctly predicted by investors, the agency costs induced
by ATPs would be ultimately borne by the entrepreneur going public, who would, thus, want to
eliminate ATPs from firms’ charters. The model provides an explanation for this apparent puzzle,
as it shows that, because of the incentive effect of control costs, their optimal level will be positive.
It is interesting to note that, consistently with the prediction of Proposition 9, Field and Karpoff
(2002) document no significant differences in long-run performance (measured as operating return
on assets) between IPO firms with and without takeover defenses (although they do find better
performance in the short-run for IPO firms with takeover defenses). These results are, however,
in contrast with those obtained in studies, such as the one by Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003),
that consider seasoned firms.
6.4 Optimal ownership structure and performance
To the extent that ownership structure is relatively stable over time or that there is a positive and
monotonic relation between ownership concentration at the IPO stage and long term ownership
concentration,20 propositions 6 and 7 also have implications regarding firms’ optimal ownership
structure. Let us assume, along the lines of Burkart, Gromb, and Panunzi (1997), that only the
largest shareholder bears the cost of intervention, and let l be the ownership share of the largest
shareholder. Suppose further that total control costs are C, which cannot be determined by the
entrepreneur and are independent of ownership structure. To avoid intervention by the largest







20Kaplan, Sensoy, and Stro¨mberg (2006) report large changes in ownership structure in the first three years after
the IPO for a sample of venture capital-funded firms. Ownership structure at the IPO stage, however, could still be
monotonically related to long-term ownership structure.
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Letting c = Cl , one can carry out the analysis like in previous sections and obtain the optimal
ownership share of the largest shareholder as l∗(θ) = Cc∗(θ) , where c
∗(θ) is the optimal level of
control costs. As in Burkart, Gromb, and Panunzi (1997), if c∗(θ) > C (which will happen if
C is small), too much shareholder control may be counterproductive, even if we abstract from
the potential liquidity or diversification costs to be borne by the largest shareholder. Further,
concentration will be larger the larger the exogenous level of control costs (C). Finally, Proposition
7 provides predictions about the determinants of ownership concentration: ownership concentration
will be increasing in α and I and decreasing in p. It is worth noting that Proposition 9 implies that
if l is set optimally, firms’ returns on assets should be independent of ownership concentration, as
originally proposed by Demsetz (1983).
6.5 Firm size and control costs
In previous sections, I have investigated the effects of changes in I, other things equal, on the
manager’s action choice, expected compensation and the optimal level of control costs. As remarked
in Subsection 6.1, changes in I should be interpreted as changes in the net present value of the
project, and not as changes in project size, since one would expect changes in size to affect not
only the required initial investment, but also the expected value of the project. To investigate the
effect of size, I assume next that revenues are given by:
x = s+ pa+ ², (15)
where s, the fixed component of revenues, measures the size of the investment project. I assume
that I = ψ(s) with ψ′ ≥ 1, implying that it is not possible to increase the net present value of the
project simply by increasing its size. To simplify notation, let x = s + pa and x∗ = s + pa∗. If
revenues are determined according to equation (15), the manager’s compensation if the project is
financed is:
m(²|a, c, s, θ) =

0 if ² < −x
x+ ² if −x < ² < −x+ c
c if ² > −x+ c
(16)
26
An analysis analogous to the one in previous sections leads to the following predictions about the
effect of size on managerial effort and optimal control costs:
Proposition 10
1. For any project that obtains financing, a∗(c, s, θ) is decreasing in s for any c, θ.
2. Em∗(c, s, θ) ≡ Em(a∗(c, s, θ), c, s, θ) is increasing in s for any c, θ.
3. The optimal level of control costs is decreasing in s for any θ.
The result that effort is decreasing in size follows from the fact that an increase in size shifts to
the left the region in the support of ² in which the manager is the residual claimant (see Figure 3).
Therefore, as long as expected revenues are greater than control costs (s+pa∗ > c), the probability
that the manager is the residual claimant (the shaded area in Figure 3) decreases as size increases.
It follows that the manager’s marginal return of effort decreases, which brings about the reduction
in a∗. An increase in size has the direct effect of increasing expected compensation for any a. This
direct effect is larger than the negative indirect effect on expected compensation due to the fall in
a∗. Therefore, expected compensation increases in s, in accordance with the well known positive
empirical correlation between firm size and pay. Part 3 follows from the fact that the combined
negative effects on net present value of a higher I and of a lower effort level (from Part 1) more
than compensate the positive effect of size on net present value. Therefore, an increase in s makes
the financing constraint more demanding and lowers the optimal c.
It is worth remarking that, to derive Proposition 10, I have identified size with the fixed com-
ponent of revenues and assumed that the initial investment is increasing in size. It is, however,
conceivable that increases in size could be also accompanied by increases in p. In such a case,
the effect of a change in size on a∗ and the optimal level of control costs would depend on the
relative strength of the effect of the change in s analyzed in Proposition 10 and of the effect of the
































































Figure 3: The impact of size (s) on optimal effort.
7 Conclusion
This paper develops a model of the firm in which the manager enjoys real control over all decisions,
including setting his own compensation, unless shareholders decide to exercise their control rights.
The model allows us to study the consequences of managerial discretion over pay for compensation
and incentives, and the effect that shareholder power has on those variables. The model shows, ex-
pectedly, that increasing shareholders’ control costs (that is, reducing shareholder power) increases
the level of managerial compensation. It also shows, less expectedly, that increases in control costs
improve managerial incentives and lead to a higher total surplus. The positive effect of an increase
in control costs on incentives may, in fact, be strong enough to lead to higher profits.
As a result of the incentive effects of control costs, the model predicts that a positive level of
control costs may be not only compatible, but, in fact, necessary for firms to obtain financing.
Thus, the model provides an explanation for the finding that firms’ governance arrangements do
not attempt to minimize control costs even at the going-public stage. The model also allows us
to derive the optimal level of control costs for a firm going public, and shows that this optimal
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level is increasing in the return of the manager’s effort and in the efficiency of the investment, and
decreasing in the size of the project and the severity of the conflict of interest between the manager
and shareholders.
Finally, the model yields predictions about the equilibrium relationship between optimal control
costs and performance. When performance is measured in terms of expected cash flows or total
surplus, the equilibrium relationship between firm performance and control costs is positive. How-
ever, when the measure of performance is shareholders’ return on assets, there is no relationship
between equilibrium performance and control costs.
This paper is, to my knowledge, the first attempt to provide a formal model of executive
compensation in which the manager has discretion to set his own compensation. To highlight
the main forces at work, I have left aside elements that are likely to play an important role in
shaping managerial incentives and firms’ financing choices in practice. These limitations of the
model point at several interesting avenues for future research. First, I have investigated the role
of shareholders’ costs of control as determinants of the manager’s compensation. However, other
governance dimensions, such as the manager’s ownership share or the degree to which the board is
captured by the manager surely have an effect on the determination of the manager’s compensation
and, thus, on incentives as well. Analyzing how these different dimensions interact appears as an
interesting extension of the model. Similarly, I have assumed that the entrepreneur issues equity to
finance the project. Thus, I have left aside capital structure decisions and their effect on executive
pay and incentives. I have also made the simplifying assumption that it is not possible to enforce
any contingent contract. Although the analysis of partially incomplete contracts has proven elusive,
this assumption could be relaxed so as to consider the constraints that managerial power imposes on
the design of executive compensation contracts. Finally, I have ignored informational asymmetries,
which are likely to play an important role in determining shareholders’ intervention. Thus, while
I have assumed that shareholders know the firm’s state when deciding whether to intervene, most
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often, managers have superior information about the firm’s prospects and can control the amount of
information that is communicated to shareholders. The analysis of these informational asymmetries
is left for future work.
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A Proofs





φ(²)d²− αa∗ = 0 (FOC)






p2[φ(−pa∗ + c)− φ(−pa∗)] + α > 0, (17)
since at a∗, ∂
2EU
∂a2
= −p2[φ(−pa∗ + c)− φ(−pa∗)]− α < 0.
The fact that EU is monotonically increasing in c follows from the envelope theorem:
∂EU
∂c
(a∗, c, θ) = cφ(−pa∗ + c)− cφ(−pa∗ + c) +
∫ ∞
−pa∗+c
φ(²)d² > 0 (18)
Since ∂a
∗
∂c > 0 implies that η(a
∗) increases with c, ∂EU
∗
∂c (a
∗(c, θ), c, θ) < ∂Em∂c (a
∗(c, θ), c, p). Thus,
∂Em
∂c (a
∗(c, θ), c, p) > 0. ¥













−pa∗ φ(²)d²− pa∗(φ(−pa∗ + c)− φ(−pa∗))
p2[φ(−pa∗ + c)− φ(−pa∗)] + α (20)
Now, from







21It can be shown (see Appendix B) that: 1) there is a unique a∗(c, θ) that satisfies the first-order condition; 2)
∂2EU
∂a2
(a∗, c, θ) < 0; and 3) a∗(c, θ) identifies the unique local and global optimal level of effort, even when EU is not
globally concave.
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where the second equality follows from (20). ¥
Proof of Proposition 3. Let







If the manager were the sole owner of the firm, he would maximize EV (a, θ). As it was the case for
Proposition 1, it can be shown (see Appendix B) that the properties of φ ensure that the first-order
condition ∂EV∂a = 0 is both necessary and sufficient for optimality, and that if we let ae(θ) denote
the maximizer of EV , then: 1) ae(θ) is given by ∂EV∂a (ae(θ), θ) = 0; 2) ae(θ) is the unique local and
global maximizer; and 3) ∂EV∂a (a, θ) > 0 for any a < ae(θ) and
∂EV
∂a (a, θ) < 0 for any a > ae(θ).
Thus, for a∗ defined by (FOC):
∂EV
∂a
(a∗, θ) = p
∫ ∞
−pa∗
φ(²)d²− αa∗ > p
∫ −pa∗+c
−pa∗
φ(²)d²− αa∗ = 0, (25)
so a∗(c, θ) < ae(θ), for any (c, θ).
That Ex∗(c, θ) ≡ E(x|a∗(c, θ), c, θ) is increasing in c follows immediately from ac > 0. The
facts that a∗(c, θ) < ae(θ) and ∂EV∂a (a, θ) > 0 for any a < ae(θ), together with ac > 0, imply that
EV ∗(c, θ) = EV (a∗(c, θ), θ) is increasing in c. ¥
Proof of Proposition 4. In the text, it was shown that
∂Ed∗
∂c





Therefore, Ed∗ is increasing at c if and only if pac > 1. From (17), it follows that
pac =
p2φ(−pa∗ + c)
p2φ(−pa∗ + c)− p2φ(−pa∗) + α (27)
Therefore pac > 1 if and only if α < p2φ(−pa∗). Now, from ac > 0 and φ′(a) > 0 for a < 0,
it follows that if c1 > c0, then p2φ(−pa∗(c1, θ)) < p2φ(−pa∗(c0, θ)). Therefore, if pac(c0, θ) < 1,
then pac(c1, θ) < 1. It follows that a necessary and sufficient condition for pac > 1 for some c is
pac(0, θ) > 1, that is:
p2φ(−pa∗(0, θ)) > α (28)










Further, if pac(0, θ) > 1, then pac(c, θ) ≥ 1 for any c ∈ [0, c˜], where c˜ is defined implicitly by
α = p2φ(−pa∗(c˜, θ)) (30)
¥
Proof of Proposition 7. The optimal level of control costs, c∗, is such that c∗ > c˜ (for c˜ defined
in (30)) and: ∫ ∞
−pa∗(c∗,θ)+c∗
(pa∗(c∗, θ) + ²− c∗)φ(²)d² = I (31)




















By definition of c˜, it follows from c∗ > c˜ that 1 − pac > 0. Therefore, cI < 0. Now, from (19)
we know that aα < 0, so cα < 0. Further cp > 0 since




p2[φ(−pa∗ + c)− φ(−pa∗)] + α > 0 (33)
¥
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Proof of Proposition 8. Let Ex∗∗(θ) = Ex∗(c∗(θ), θ) = pa∗(c∗(θ), θ). Then:
∂Ex∗∗
∂I
= paccI < 0 (34)
∂Ex∗∗
∂α
= paccα + paα < 0 (35)
∂Ex∗∗
∂p
= a∗ + paccp + pap = paccp + (a∗ + pap) > 0, (36)
where the signs follow from Propositions 1 and 7, and from the proof of Proposition 2. Therefore,
for any parameter z, ∂Ex
∗∗
∂z and cz have the same sign (since it was shown in Proposition 7 that
cI < 0, cα < 0, and cp > 0). Analogous calculations show that ∂EV
∗∗
∂z and cz have the same sign,
so EV ∗∗ and c∗ move in the same direction when any parameter changes. ¥




φ(²)d²− αa∗(c, s, θ) = 0 (37)





∗ + c)− φ(−x∗)]
p2[φ(−x∗ + c)− φ(−x∗)] + α, (38)
where the denominator is equal to −∂2EU
∂a2
(a∗, c, s, θ) > 0. Since φ′(²) > 0 for ² < 0 and φ′(²) < 0
for ² > 0, and φ is symmetric about zero, it follows that φ(−x∗ + c) − φ(−x∗) < 0 if and only if
−x∗ + c > x∗ > 0, or c > 2x∗. Therefore, recalling that x∗ = s+ pa∗:
as < 0 ⇐⇒ φ(−x∗ + c)− φ(−x∗) > 0 ⇐⇒ a∗ > c− 2s2p (39)





















The optimal level of control costs, c∗(θ), is such that c∗(θ) > c˜(θ) and:
∫ ∞
−x∗+c∗
(x∗ + ²− c∗)φ(²)d² = ψ(s) (41)












) < 0, (42)
where the negative sign follows from the assumption that ψ′ ≤ 1 and the fact that
1 + pas =
α
p2[φ(−x∗ + c)− φ(−x∗)] + α < 1 (43)
The last inequality follows from the fact that for financing to be possible x∗ > c, which implies
that φ(−x∗ + c)− φ(−x∗) > 0, since φ′(²) > 0 for any ² < 0. ¥
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B Sufficiency of the First-Order Condition of the Manager’s Prob-
lem
Lemma B.1
1. EU(0, c, θ) > 0 and ∂EU∂a (0, c, θ) > 0, for any c > 0.
2. If ∂EU∂a (a0, c, θ) =
∂EU
∂a (a1, c, θ) = 0, then a0 = a1 = a
∗, and a∗ is a global maximizer of EU .
Proof. The first part is proven immediately, since










(0, c, θ) = p
∫ c
0








> 0 only if φ(−pa+ c)− φ(−pa) < 0.
Since φ is the p.d.f. of a normal distribution: φ′(t) > 0 if t < 0, and φ′(t) < 0 if t > 0.
Thus, if pa > c, then φ(−pa+ c) − φ(−pa) > 0. Further, symmetry of φ implies that for q, b > 0,
φ(−q) > φ(b) if and only if q < b. Therefore, if pa < c, then φ(−pa + c) − φ(−pa) > 0 whenever
pa > −pa+ c, that is, whenever a > c2p (see Figure 4). Thus ∂
2EU
∂a2
< 0 for any a > c2p . Further, if
a < c2p , then
∂3EU
∂a3
= p2[pφ′(−pa+ c)− pφ′(−pa)] < 0, (47)
since if a < c2p , then φ
′(−pa + c) < 0 < φ′(−pa). Therefore, if ∂2EU
∂a2
< 0 for some a0 < c2p , then
∂2EU
∂a2
< 0 for any a > a0. Further, if ∂
2EU
∂a2
< 0 at a = 0, then ∂
2EU
∂a2
< 0 everywhere. Therefore,
∂2EU
∂a2
> 0 for some a if and only if ∂
2EU
∂a2
> 0 at a = 0, which holds if and only if:




︷ ︸︸ ︷ ︷ ︸︸ ︷φ


























Figure 4: Normal density function. If −pa + c = −k, −pa = −l, and −k < −l < 0, then
φ(−k) > φ(−l). If −pa+ c = b, −pa = −q, and b > q > 0 then φ(−q) > φ(b).
Therefore, if p2[φ(0) − φ(c)] < α, EU is strictly concave. This, together with ∂EU∂a (0, c, θ) > 0,
means that there is a unique maximizer, a∗, and that ∂EU∂a (a
∗, c, θ) = 0.
If p2[φ(0)− φ(c)] > α, then the facts that ∂3EU
∂a3
< 0 for any a < c2p and that
∂2EU
∂a2
< 0 for any
a ≥ c2p imply that ∂
2EU
∂a2
≥ 0 only in an interval [0, u], where u < c2p . In this case, EU would look
as depicted in Figure 5. Now, the fact that ∂
2EU
∂a2
≥ 0 for any a ≤ u, together with ∂EU∂a (0, c, θ) > 0,
implies that ∂EU∂a (a, c, θ) > 0 for any a ≤ u. Thus, there are no maximizers of EU in the interval
[0, u]. Since EU is strictly concave for a > u, it follows that there is a unique maximizer, a∗ > u,
and that ∂EU∂a (a







EU ′′ > 0





Figure 5: Expected utility function when −p2[φ(c)− φ(0)]− α > 0.
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